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Dipak Patel v. The Attorney General [2020] CCZ 005
Josiah Kalala 1
Facts
In 2016, the Constitution of Zambia was amended, introducing a provision that required the
National Assembly to approve all debt before it was contracted. The Constitutional amendment
also introduced a requirement that legislation relating to the contraction and guaranteeing of
debt should provide the category, nature and other terms and conditions of a loan, grant or
guarantee that will require approval by the National Assembly before the loan, grant or
guarantee is executed. Unfortunately, since the constitutional amendment in 2016, the
government of Zambia acquired numerous loans without the approval of the National
Assembly of Zambia. The Petitioner, a former Minister, petitioned the Constitutional Court
alleging that the Minister of Finance and the Government had violated the Constitution by
acquiring debt without the prior approval of the National Assembly of Zambia. The Petitioner
also alleged that the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act 2 was unconstitutional as it
failed to mandate the Executive to seek approval for debt before it was contracted.
Holding
The Constitutional Court, by majority decision, dismissed the petition finding that the
requirement for National Assembly approval was not mandatory.
Lady Justice Munalula, in her dissenting opinion, found that the government had breached the
law by not presenting debt for approval before it was contracted in the dissenting judgment.
Significance
Contrary to the findings in the majority judgment, National Assembly oversight in debt
contraction is not only to mitigate high indebtedness. Instead, National Assembly oversight
over debt contraction is rooted in the principles of separation of powers and checks and
balances. Lady Justice Munalula, in her dissenting opinion, referenced these principles in
dismissing the arguments made by the Respondents. 3 The Constitution of Zambia sets out the
functions of the National Assembly concerning oversight over the Executive, four of the five
functions are directly associated with public finance. 4 In contrast, the fifth function relates to
the approval of international agreements or treaties before they are contracted. Further, the
National Assembly is responsible for approving the Financial Estimates for Revenue and
Expenditure 5 and approving the Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act and
Excess Expenditure Appropriation Act through its legislative function. 6
Quite simply, while the Executive is responsible for raising revenues and spending the said
revenues, the Constitution does not envisage that this should occur without the National
Assembly's oversight. As the President Hakainde Hichilema led administration tackles the debt
accrued by the previous administration, it has embarked on a borrowing campaign in much the
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same way it was before. Perhaps encouraged by the decision of the Constitutional Court, the
new administration has announced several public financing agreements, including the
announcement of a Staff-Level Agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Particularly
alarming is that the direction taken by the new administration is in stark contrast to the preelection rhetoric issued about debt contraction. The current Minister of Finance made a witness
statement in the Dipak Patel Case.
Another significant finding in the majority judgment was that the Constitutional Court, despite
finding that there was no mandatory requirement for National Assembly to approve debt before
it was contracted, the Constitutional Court stated, that the Loans and Guarantees
(Authorisation) Act ‘must be amended, repealed or replaced as the case may be.’ 7 The
Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that no constitutional provision should be read in
isolation. However, a reading of the articles relating to debt contraction under the constitution
does not have the effect of limiting the powers of the National Assembly to approve debt.
Article 207 of the Constitution, which the Court interpreted as the intention to make article 63
(2) (d) only applicable to certain loans and guarantees, does not restrict the power of the
National Assembly. Article 207 (1) gives the government the authority to borrow according to
the law. Article 207 (2) makes it mandatory that the law governing borrowing must provide for
the ‘category, nature and other terms and conditions of a loan, grant or guarantee, that will
require the approval by the National Assembly before the loan, grant or guarantee is executed.’
In the absence of a law providing the said categories, nature and conditions that require
National Assembly approval, the provisions of Article 63 (2) should not be read restrictively.
In effect, Article 207 does two things; it allows the government to borrow according to the law
and enables the law to limit the nature of the loans and guarantees that require national
assembly oversight. In the absence of such limitation or structure restricting the type of
borrowing that requires the approval of the National Assembly, National Assembly must
approve all debt before it is contracted.
In several the Constitutional Court judgments, the Court has gone to great lengths to discuss
principles of interpretation. Article 267 of the Constitution provides the primary rules for
interpreting the constitution. Among the canons for interpretation in the constitution is the
requirement that interpretation must promote the Constitution's purposes, values, and principles
and contribute to good governance. The interpretation of the Constitutional provisions, in this
case, did not adequately address the purposes, values and principles of the Constitution. In
addition, the judgment did not contribute to good governance.
On the contrary, it perpetuates the unlimited Executive trope that undermines good governance.
For example, the National Assembly is responsible for appropriating funds for expenditure and
ensuring equity in the distribution of national resources; any borrowing the government
undertakes falls within the National Assembly oversight functions. That is to say; the National
Assembly must ensure that borrowed monies are equitably distributed and appropriated for
expenditure in accordance with the law. The judgment in effect creates an exception to this
procedure. For instance, the Minister of Finance recently announced a loan from the World
Bank to build schools in previously neglected places. This announcement, in effect, is the
Executive appropriating funds which is a function of the National Assembly. As the Court has
repeatedly stated, Constitutional provisions must not be read in isolation. However, they should
not be interpreted in isolation either. The role of the National Assembly in debt contraction is
to ensure that constitutional principles such as transparency and accountability are upheld.
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Another significant factor that the petition, judgment, and dissenting opinion considered were
how the National Assembly approved loans before they were contracted. The petitioner
envisaged that approval was in the form of a Bill which once approved becomes legislation.
The judgment or the dissenting opinion did not dispute this view. However, there are challenges
with this approach. Where National Assembly exercises legislative authority, it does so as part
of Parliament. Article 62 of the Constitution is clear on Parliament consisting of the President
and National Assembly, and that legislative authority vests in Parliament. If approving of debt
is to be construed as a legislative function, it undermines the spirit and indeed letter of Article
63 (2), which mandates the National Assembly to oversee the performance of executive
functions. Executive authority is vested in and exercised by the President. It would be
counterintuitive if the president were a part of the oversight.
Another significance of the decision by the majority was how they interpreted the Constitution
of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2016 and, in particular, sections 6 and 21. Section 6 of
Act No. 1 of 2016 requires that existing legislation should continue in force as if it was enacted
after the 2016 constitutional amendments and should be construed with the necessary
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions to ensure that the legislation
conforms with the constitution. This section emphasises the supremacy of the constitution and
requires that any reading of the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act should be construed
with the necessary modifications and adaptations to ensure that it complies with the
constitution. The court focused on section 6 (2) of Act. No 1 of 2016 and did not interpret
section 6 (1) of Act No. 1, which provides for how existing legislation should be construed.
Further, the court was of the view that there was a need for legislation to give effect to the
provisions of Article 63 (2) (d) because of the provisions of Article 207 of the Constitution. It
is unclear how the provisions of Article 63 (2) (d) require an act of Parliament to take effect,
as the provisions do not infer as much. Article 207 can be interpreted to provide the
discretionary power for the government to borrow, which, if the government does decide,
should be done in accordance with the law; secondly, the article makes it mandatory that any
law should provide the categories and nature of the loans. The categories, in essence, provide
limitations on both the borrowing power of the government and the potential for the National
Assembly to get bogged down by approving agreement after agreement. In the absence of such
limitations, and with the apparent authority vested in the National Assembly to approve of
loans, all borrowing must be approved by the National Assembly. If, for example, Parliament
enacted a law that did not provide categories for loans that needed approval, the courts’
interpretation would render Article 63 (2) (d) moot, which was not the drafters’ intention.
This case highlights a flaw in our parliamentary system in that National Assembly has not been
proactive in curbing executive excesses. National Assembly approval of debt occurs in two
ways, the first is supposed to be through the National Assembly procedure for approving
executive decisions, and the second is through the National Assemblies participation in the
passing of legislation. So far, the National Assembly has not been proactive in requiring the
executive to provide information of loans it takes out. Further, the National Assembly, as part
of the parliamentary business, has been a passive bystander in legislative processes. The
Executive often drives the legislative process in Zambia. There is little involvement from a
policy perspective from Members of Parliament. This means that legislative proposals
presented to the National Assembly go through with limited scrutiny in most instances.
Conclusion
How National Assembly approves debt before it is contracted should predominantly be a matter
for National Assembly procedure rather than the legislative process. Article 77 (1) provides
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that the National Assembly shall regulate its procedure and make Standing Orders for the
conduct of its business. In this regard, the National Assembly Standing Orders provide that one
of the functions of the Budget Committee is to examine public debt before it is contracted.
Lady Justice Munalula observed that finding that debt contracted without the approval of the
National Assembly is unconstitutional would have negative impacts on the country. This
finding perhaps explains why the Court interpreted the provisions in the manner it did.
However, in her opinion, Lady Justice Munalula suggested a ‘suspension of the declaration of
unconstitutionality’ as a solution for avoiding the negative impact of such a declaration. 8 This
approach implies that the Constitutional Court has the authority to suspend compliance with
the constitution temporarily. Constitutional supremacy is a fundamental principle of
constitutional democracies like Zambia. The Constitutional Court has reiterated this position
repeatedly. Therefore, article 2 (b) of the Constitution provides that every person has a duty to
prevent a person from suspending or illegally abrogating the Constitution.
As Zambia comes to terms with the years of unencumbered public borrowing, there is a need
for introspection by the new administration in how it tackles borrowing in the future. In his
budget speech, the Minister of Finance announced that a Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation)
Bill would be presented to National Assembly during the current session. However, it remains
to be seen how the Bill will impose restrictions on borrowing without National Assembly
approval. Indications from the first few months of the new administration show that it is
unlikely that a different approach will be taken. In addition, curbing corruption was a key
message for the President in his campaign and several press conferences he has had since taking
office. Therefore, the link between public debt and corruption cannot be overstated.
The decision by the Constitutional Court undermines constitutionalism. It reinforces the
argument made by Kaaba, who observed that there is widespread corruption in the management
of public debt and related such corruption to the failure of constitutionalism. 9 Empirical data
supports Kaaba’s conclusion on debt and constitutionalism. For example, Cooray et al. found
that “Governments seeking to reduce public debt should strive to curb both corruption and the
size of the shadow economy because both contribute to increasing government debt.” 10
The decision of the Constitutional Court undermines good governance and basic principles of
public finance. From a comparative perspective, oversight bodies like the Congress and the
House in the United States, the House of Commons in the UK, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat
in Germany all play a crucial role in public finance management. The decision of the
Constitutional Court undermines the constitutional provisions that ought to inform public
finance and debt contraction and renders the National Assembly oversight over debt
contraction ineffective. When in opposition, the new administration opposed to debt
contraction without National Assembly oversight continued the trend is disappointing. There
is hope that legislative proposals will be tabled that will give genuine effect to oversight
functions of the National Assembly.

Dipak Patel v. The Attorney General [2020] CCZ 005, Dissenting Opinion at J25
O'brien Kaaba, 'License to Loot: Failure of Constitutionalism in the Management of Sovereign Debt in
Zambia' [2021] 48(2018) Zambia Law Journal, 1-24
10
Arusha Cooray and others, 'How Does Corruption Affect Public Debt? An Empirical Analysis' [2017] 90,
World Development, 115-127
8
9

30

